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ENDING THE WAR ON DRUGS
AND CHILDREN
DANIEL D. POLSBY*
I. INTRODUCTION
I am much in favor of decriminalizing the commerce in and use of most'
recreational drugs. I believe that, on net, this policy would leave society better
off than it is now. Acknowledging that the matter is, however, uncertain, it also
seems to me that uncertainties, at least of this kind, ought to be resolved in
favor of liberty. Still, the most prominent arguments for decriminalization, such
as those of Ethan Nadelmann2 and Arnold Trebach,3 seem to me decidedly
unsatisfying. They lack an appreciation for the tragic dimension of the problem.
Decriminalization would certainly do much harm; it is just that failure to
decriminalize must also do much harm. I do not believe that the legalization
argument has much of a chance if its burden is to show that this reform would
definitely, or probably, lower the social costs associated with drugs. But it is
possible to show that the distributional consequences of legalization would
improve the world. That is the argument I sponsor here.
II. LEGALIZATION MUST HAVE HEAVY COSTS
It seems to me that all arguments for decriminalizing4 drugs are
dismissable out of hand unless they assume that such a reform would result in
materially increasing the amount of experimental, and also chronic, use by
minors. That significant new public health (and other) costs would thus accrue
must also be assumed. Such predictions emerge straightforwardly from price
. Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law. Grateful
acknowledgment is due to Professor Kleiman and Professor Meares for their helpful comments on
an earlier draft.
1. One must reserve the case of genuinely criminogenic substances for separate and more
detailed discussion. There is some evidence that amphetamines, at least in some of the forms in
which they are illicitly used, can provoke belligerent, assaultive behavior in otherwise peaceable
people. How much third-party harm is thus implicated in the real world seems not to be definitely
known, but the matter is worth careful study. Of course it is a complicating factor in policy analysis
that alcohol is almost certainly much more criminogenic than any other ingested substance.
2. Ethan A. Nadelmann, The Case for Legalization, 92 PUB. INTEREST 3 (1988).
3. ARNOLD S. TREBACH, THE GREAT DRUG WAR (1987).
4. This essay rejects the convention, observed by some analysts and perhaps useful in some
contexts, of distinguishing between "legalization" and "decriminalization" of drugs, or distinguishing
the "war on drugs" from ordinary, workaday criminal law enforcement of prohibitionist drug laws.
I shall use these respective terms interchangeably.
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theory, but even if one did not actually predict these bad outcomes, presuming
them produces an altogether fair allocation of proof burdens in this particular
public conversation. Accordingly, it seems to me that the case for
decriminalization begins with a heavy handicap. Moreover, this handicap
becomes even heavier when the focus turns to children, because, unlike the case
with adults (where the matter is not at all cut-and-dry),5 it ought to be axiomatic
that the enjoyment which children might derive from using recreational drugs
cannot be counted as "benefits" in any cost-benefit analysis of removing
criminal law from center stage in the regulation of drugs, any more than the
enjoyment which bank robbers derive from their occupation can be counted in
the cost-benefit analysis of bank robbery. The matter is therefore simple.
Categorically, children must not use recreational drugs at all, and if we weaken
(let alone abolish) criminal sanctions on adult use, that must undermine that
object, and we shall have more of that which (we say) we would like to have
none at all. The first question that has to be addressed, then, is whether this
(assumed) state of affairs, all by itself, ends the debate. My answer is "no."
III. CRIMINALIZATION "To PROTECT THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN"
CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED
We should not seek to structure the affairs of the entire society around the
interests of the children-the X additional experimenters and the Y additional
regular users-who would be harmed if the possession and use of cocaine,
heroin and marijuana by adults were no longer punished by the criminal law.
In the first place, as a general matter it is unwise to define the rights of adults
according to worries about the susceptibilities of the most vulnerable, but in the
second place, at least in this context, it is not even coherent to try to do so. The
matter of drug policy is not too different in posture from that of pornography,
which we first began to seriously face in this country in the mid-1950s. Under
the rule of Regina v. Hicklin,6 an 1868 case from the Court of Queen's Bench,
the obscenity question was "whether the tendency of the matter charged... is
to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences,
and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall."7 By implication, the
rights of all should be determined by the vulnerabilities of the peculiarly
susceptible. The United States Supreme Court rejected this as a tenable
5. There is not much of a case to be made for nakedly paternalistic drug prohibition of adult
use because there is little reason to suppose that the government's generic information about what
is good for a person will regularly beat individuals' specific information about what is good for
them. But the possibility of justifying a prohibitionist regime on self-paternalistic grounds remains
a troubling possibility. See generally Thomas C. Schelling, The Intimate Contest for Self Command,
60 PuB. INTEREST 94 (1980).
6. 3 L.R.-Q.B. 360 (1868).
7. Id. at 371.
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approach in Roth v. United States-a First Amendment case to be sure, but still
one that asks for an answer to the same question, whether there is a limit,
defined by nuisance to the population as a whole, beyond which we should not
feel free to childproof the world. Cigarettes and alcoholic beverages are, of
course, clich examples of products tolerated in the interest of all though they
are never (we may presume) appropriately used by children. But more
generally, as everyone who has ever lived in a family well knows, there are
many situations in which "what is good for the child" and "what is good for the
family as a whole" may be thought of as in tension. There is no legal or moral
rule that dictates that the child's interest, considered in isolation (as though that
were realistically possible!) must always prevail.
The question of decriminalization must be answered, not by looking at the
effects on children, but on society as a whole. And if those interests
uncontroversially do embrace that which affects the health and welfare of all
children, certain children, or for that matter any one child, they certainly do not
do so lexically in regard to drugs. And indeed, one might go a step further and
insist that it is not even meaningful to defend criminalization as an attempt to
respect the interests of children vis-i-vis drugs as a preemptive first priority.
The world is too complicated for any such thing to be possible. Though X
number of children are (we assume) spared any involvement with drugs because
drugs are illegal, Y number of children are injured because drugs are
illegal-because:
(1) one or both of their parents have legal difficulties because drugs are
illegal; or
(2) their neighborhoods are more dangerous because deadly criminals try
to monopolize drug distribution channels by violent means,9 which
leads to
(3) massive disinvestment in neighborhoods so affected'-that is, the
flight of both financial and human capital," which harms
(4) the life chances of children, which not only accelerates (3), but which
also increases the hedonic rationality of children taking drugs (because
their opportunities for personal fulfillment through licit means will be
less) as well as the instrumental rationality of children dealing drugs
8. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
9. Alfred Blurnstein, Youth Violence, Guns, and the Illicit-Drug Industry, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 10 (1995).
10. John J. Dilulio, Jr., The Impact of Inner City Crime, 96 PUB. INTEREST 28, 36 (1989).
11. WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DIsADVANTAGED (1987).
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(because, thanks to (3), alternative economic opportunities will be less
available to them, and protecting their reputation for being criminally
uninvolved will be less valuable).
This position is not by any means a comprehensive indictment of the war
on drugs (or the policy of criminalizing drug abuse), but it does very well for
beginning a discussion meant to focus on children. And although this account
is full of conjecture about what the facts, if only we could know them, would
show (and in all probability so it must remain), it seems no longer possible to
doubt that the sketch, in its essentials, is accurate. The cost side of the war on
drugs must be far, far larger than the $12,500,000,000 that has recently been
spent annually in the federal government's war on drugs, most of it on drug-
specific interdiction and law enforcement, 2 and at least as much spent by states
on the same business. The costs of criminalization are to be found in the
damage done to human beings and communities by unsustainable attempts to
exceed the limits of the criminal sanction. 3 I shall not argue the case for the
social gains to be realized from transferring anti-drug law enforcement efforts
to other, more socially productive lines in the government budget. For reasons
to be explained presently, these opportunity costs are, properly considered, quite
small and possibly even non-existent.
The violent crime wave of the late 1980s and early 1990s has almost
certainly been the unintended consequence of prohibitionist drug laws, just as the
violent crime wave of the 1920s was the unintended consequence of the
Eighteenth Amendment's prohibition on alcohol. Unlike the great crime wave
of the late 1960s and 1970s, the crime wave that began in the mid-1980s was
not driven by demographic, but by economic, factors. Thirty years ago as the
Baby Boomers came of age, there was a sizable increase in the relative size of
the population of young males, and with it an increase in crime, which is largely
a behavior of young males. Nothing of the sort happened in the mid-1980s.
Scholars have noticed the coincidence between the arrival of crack cocaine
as an important commercial commodity and the spiking of the rates of murder
and victimization among urban males age fourteen and older. Crack cocaine,
unlike the powdered kind, usually trades in small batches. A given kilogram of
cocaine will yield ten to twenty times as many retail transactions in the form of
crack than it will in the form of powder. This means that the coming of crack
portends a large expansion of job opportunities in the retail end of the drug
trade. The war on drugs cannot plausibly be blamed for the development of the
crack cocaine trade, but more or less coincident with the arrival of crack, the
12. NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY BUDGET SUMMARY 214 (1992).
13. HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMrTs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968).
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budget for the war on drugs began to skyrocket, ultimately sextupling in a matter
of only a dozen years. Obviously the war on drugs must have created, even if
transiently, a window of economic opportunity for young men willing to put up
with the rapidly increasing risks, legal and illegal, of drug dealing. Potential
competitors abandoned the marketplace, voluntarily or because they were
arrested, or-as has apparently happened in tens of thousands of cases since the
mid-1980s-because they were murdered. Large amounts of cash rewarded
those who remained, but also attracted violence, further diminishing competition
and heightening the returns in the business. The homicide victimization risks
for African American males age eighteen to twenty-four more than doubled in
these years, to over 100 in 100,000. Alfred Blumstein argues that this increase
was caused by "the recruitment of young people into illicit drug markets. "14
This explanation is persuasive so far as it goes, but it leaves a crucial loose
end: it does not explain why, for the first time since crime statistics have been
kept, the victimization experience of younger teenagers, whose likelihood of
killing or being killed had historically been no greater than that of their parents,
began more nearly to resemble that of their older brothers. Why should the war
on drugs be triggering an increase in these numbers? Here is what must have
been happening:
" Young drug dealers, arbitraging the relative leniency of the juvenile
justice system toward drug offenses, began for the first time to be
drawn into the drug business in sizable numbers.
* The reason for this phenomenon is that the legal risks for adults
associated with drug dealing began to intensify at this time as a part
of the war on drugs, not only because more law enforcement effort
was focused upon drug dealing but
* because sanctions for adult drug law violations began to escalate
rapidly in harshness, while the punishments for most other crimes
were not being aggravated as much or at all. Because of the
increasing relative harshness of the drug laws,
* older boys and young men with criminal predispositions would in
many cases be better off on the margin if they substituted robbing drug
dealers (whose ranks were beginning to include significant numbers of
juveniles) for dealing drugs themselves.
14. Blunstein, supra note 9, at 10.
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* Unless he arms himself, a fourteen-year-old is not usually a match for
an eighteen-year-old in a showdown. This explains why one should
expect to see increased demand by juvenile drug dealers for firearms,
namely to protect inventory and receipts from predation by older boys
and young men with recently changed legal incentives.
* Unless he arms himself, an eighteen-year-old boy is not usually a
match for a fourteen-year-old with a gun. This situation explains why
one should expect to see increased demand for firearms by young
adults who prey on younger drug dealers.
I suggest this is a credible sketch of what Blumstein has called an "arms
race" on city streets. A murder epidemic was the result. But this epidemic was
highly localized in the statistics. The rate of murder for the population as a
whole continued its secular, post-1970s decline, 5 and even the rate for the
black population, apart from the young male cohorts, was declining. 6 But the
experience of non-white teenagers and young men became so frightful so
abruptly, it persuaded Americans that our country was experiencing a pandemic
of violent crime. It was not, nor anything like it. What it was experiencing,
rather, was collateral damage from the war on drugs.
IV. THE PEACE DIVIDEND
Suppose we canceled the war on drugs tomorrow. What sort of peace
dividend could we realistically expect? Any such dividend would probably not
be dramatic, I think, and would likely be realized mainly in a more or less
distant future. The current inventory of convicted offenders would still have to
be attended to and, because if past experience is any guide, forty percent of
them will find their way back to prison within thirty-six months of being
released, and two-thirds or so of them will within five years. Their recidivism
will continue to impose costs both in the public and in the private sector. It
might at first seem this fear is misplaced, because, after all, if drugs are legal,
why should one expect released drug offenders to return to a life of crime? The
answer is: it is true, that is, that convicted drug criminals could not go back to
a life of dealing illicit drugs if dealing drugs were legal. But there is little
evidence to support the hope that, deprived of gainful employment in the
narcotics trade, dope-dealing ex-cons would turn to minimum-wage jobs rather
than other criminal activities. Despite well-publicized declarations to the
contrary, there is very little worthwhile evidence that the current prison
population of drug offenders contains any appreciable fraction of
15. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1993 SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS 388 fig.3.7 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann Pastore eds., 1994).
16. Id.
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temperamentally inert flower children, ensnared by happenstance in the war on
drugs. Though the matter could use more study, it appears that
overwhelmingly, corrections departments' prison clientele consists of persistent
repeat offenders-people who have accumulated long records of arrests and
convictions before they ever see the inside of a prison. The speculation to the
contrary seems to be based on looking at the specific crimes for which
incarcerated felons were convicted. But this methodology hardly suffices in a
world where considerably in excess of nine in ten convictions are the result of
plea bargains. It is specious to infer that a guilty plea to a non-violent crime
suggests that one is dealing with a non-violent person. The Illinois Criminal
Justice Information Authority, for example, has recently compiled data which
show that a prior conviction for a drug crime is a far better predictor of a later
conviction for a crime against the person than (for example) a prior conviction
for theft or retail theft. Many authorities support the same point. Criminals are
not, on the whole, specialists but opportunists whose behavior is a portfolio of
both violent and non-violent offending.
One should not take from the foregoing that drugs "cause" crime. Rather,
drug abuse seems to belong to a set of risk-taking behaviors, which include
crime but which encompass the whole range of risky activities in which human
beings engage, and which as any auto insurance underwriter would be glad to
confirm are more characteristic of the young, the poor and the male than of any
other part of the population. There is nothing that public policy can or should
try to do about the "male" part of the equation. The "young" part we can deal
with by waiting it out: the offense profiles of forty-year-old and older criminals
descends rapidly toward the innocuous. The "poor" part, unfortunately, we can
affect hardly at all. The private sector does not, on the whole, like ex-cons very
much, and probably could not readily or soon be persuaded to drop its
prejudices against drug felons just because drugs had been made legal. For the
same reason that one should not expect drug legalization to reduce pressure on
corrections budgets, one should not expect it to reduce pressure on law
enforcement budgets. Just because criminals deal illegal drugs does not mean
that making drugs legal will swiftly reduce the quantity of criminally disposed
individuals in circulation. The one and only sure means of doing that in the
short run is prison. It is consequently reasonable to suppose that ending the war
on drugs would simply enable law enforcement to redeploy their assets against
what, for the time being, would be the same number of criminals as before, with
the only difference being that in this reforihed world, criminals might be harder
to take out of circulation than when drugs were illegal. Suppose, in response
to legalization, criminal careers verged into behavior that was harder to detect
and prosecute than drug crimes? In that event, one should expect to see even
more pressure on law enforcement budgets than we see now.
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Of course, in the longer run, legalization of drugs would dry up a good
deal of the financial incentive to embark on a life of crime. Over the years, one
should expect this money squeeze to cause smaller numbers of youngsters to be
sucked out of the margin and into the criminal demimonde. Because there will
be fewer fourteen-year-old criminals, there should be fewer fourteen-year-old
victims. In time, the population at greatest risk for victimization should
renormalize to the relatively low rates that would and should have been seen all
along if only there had never been a war on drugs. But, in the mean time (as
previously noted) legalization of drugs must equate to at least a modest retail
price reduction, which means increased availability, which in turn means some
amount of increased consumption at least in the short run, which must in turn
lead to increased near-term demands on public health resources. 7 Even small
average changes in the population's use of narcotic drugs would be expected to
produce quite substantial changes in the tail of the distribution where drug abuse
was more acute and self-destructive. And in addition, one must expect to see
something that every parent definitely, definitely does not want to see: more
kids getting stoned more often.
V. LEGALIZATION ANYWAY
I have suggested that a decision to abandon the war on drugs presents a
textbook case of the hardest sort of sale known to public policy: large costs
near term, small and unimportant benefits near term, conjecturally large benefits
in the out-years, if ever. At this point in the argument, readers may wonder
exactly whose side I am really on. The method of the argument to this point,
though, has been to set aside, indeed to give away, the rhetorical apparatus in
which the debate about legalization is usually couched. While it is fair enough
to judge the efficacy and effects of the war on drugs by the standards and in the
language of policy analysis, the underlying behavior, to which the reproach of
criminality attaches, must ultimately be judged according to its inherent evil.
This is not, of course, to say that context and consequences do not enter into
judgments of categories of acts as evil or not, but realistically, the abuse of
drugs imposes costs primarily on the abuser himself. There are well-known
exceptions: pregnant women can damage their unborn children by smoking
cocaine; people stoned on marijuana are dangerous drivers, and so on. Where
drug use imposes serious third-party harms, there it makes sense for the criminal
law to intervene. It does so not on the basis of the trifling claim that there is
something evil about the drugs, but on the basis of the ancient and rooted
proposition that one has a duty to refrain from inflicting harm on others. But
17. MARK A. R. KLEIMAN, MARIJUANA: COSTS OF ABUSE, COSTS OF CONTROL 173-75 (1989)
(citing negative health effects associated with marijuana, cocaine, and heroin use).
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the drug itself is not an intelligible proxy for the third-party harms to which it
may lead.
Many years ago the sociologist Howard Becker claimed that the interesting
thing about marijuana was how the society selected the object of what it would
call deviant behavior.'" Why alcohol "yes" and marijuana "no"? Drugs are
a symbol, and who has regulatory possession of that symbol tells us what set of
values are dominant in society. The war on drugs appears to be a dominance
display gone amok. But the reason that the war should be abandoned is not
because it is futile (though it is) and not because of the perverse behavioral
incentives it looses upon the world (though it does that, too). The real reason
it should be abandoned is that the behavior against which it is ultimately
directed-self-medication with a psychoactive drug-is, from society's
viewpoint, simply no big deal. That it does hold a potential for damaging the
republican character, as James Q. Wilson has argued, one may stipulate. That
it can lead to self-destruction and to damaging one's personal and business
relationships is clear. But to proceed from these concessions to criminalization
is a non sequitur. Many other self-indulgences, sexual, gustatory, cupidinous
and so on, can and do have a similar bad effect on human beings and their lives.
This fact is not an argument for treating these behaviors as crimes. In general
it would be well if national drug policy were driven by the tort principle for the
assignment of liability espoused by Guido Calatiresi,' 9 namely, that socially
costly behavior should be charged to the account of whoever was in the best
position to affect whether the risk that led to the cost would be run in the first
place, and to calculate whether running it was worthwhile. This criterion
unequivocally points toward the individual drug user.
Thus, even on the pessimistic assumption that the cancellation of the war
on drugs would not lead to an immediate social surplus-because gains, if any,
from relaxing law enforcement would be offset by losses in public health
accounts-at least the costs in the reformed world would be borne more fully by
those who ought to bear them. These are the drug users themselves rather than
taxpayers and citizens who must endure the increasingly hecklesome interference
imposed by drug enforcement and its adjectives such as difficulty in crossing
international frontiers, increased income tax auditing and anti-money laundering
supervision of cash flows, and the danger, inconvenience and unfairness of a
world where harsh legal penalties ensure the existence of a flourishing illegal
market and a cadre of gangsters to support it.
18. Howard S. Becker, Becoming a Marihuana User, 59 AM. J. SOC. 235 (1953).
19. E.g., GuIDo CALABRESI, THE CosTs OF ACCIDENTS (1970); Guido Calabresi & Jon T.
Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972).
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Whatever else may be said of this proposed redistribution of the social costs
of drugs, it is quite predictable that it is likely to be regressive to some extent.
The adage that "liberty favors the wise" is, after all, but a sunny way of stating
a dark moral: liberty punishes the foolish, which, in any society will tend to
include disproportionately the young, the impulsive and (because safety is a
superior good) the poor. Hence legalization probably violates Rawls' maximin
principle,20 something that might well be enough all by itself to mobilize
respectable opinion against the whole idea. Yet perhaps the least-well-off
members of society are actually better off when they possess both their own
liberty and the consequences of their abuse of it than they would be without any
liberty but that of enjoying the fruits of Leviathan's wisdom. This, finally, must
be the argument for legalizing drugs or anything else that is dangerous mainly
to oneself. It is hard to understand why it has not had a more sympathetic
audience.
20. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 152-61 (1971) (distributional changes are disfavored
if they damage the position of the least well-off).
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